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Abstract Even though he is not very explicit about it, in Wittgenstein on Rules and Pri-
vate Language Kripke discusses two different, albeit related, skeptical theses – the first 
one in the philosophy of mind, the second one in the metaphysics of language. Usually, 
what Kripke says about one thesis can be easily applied to the other one, too; however, 
things are not always that simple. In this paper, I discuss the case of the so-called “Nor-
mativity Argument” against semantic dispositionalism (which I take to be epistemologi-
cal in nature) and argue that it is much stronger as an argument in the philosophy of mind 
than when it is construed as an argument in the metaphysics of language.
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1 Introduction
In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1981), Saul Kripke 
puts forward three arguments against dispositional analyses of 
meaning. One has to do with the fact that speakers are disposed to 
make mistakes in their use of language. Another has to do with the 
fact that speakers’ dispositions do not cover all the possible occasions 
of use. And then there is what has come to be known as ‘the Norma-
tivity Argument’, which Kripke ([1981] 1982, 37) thus summarizes:
Suppose I do mean addition by “+”. What is the relation of this sup-
position to the question how I will respond to the problem “68 + 
57”? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of this rela-
tion: if “+” meant addition, then I will answer “125”. But this is not 
the proper account of the relation, which is normative, not descrip-
tive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by “+”, I will answer 
“125”, but that, if I intend to accord with my past meaning of “+”, 
I should answer “125”. [...] The relation of meaning and intention 
to future action is normative, not descriptive.
The first two arguments I discussed elsewhere (see, e.g., Guardo 
2012a, 2012b). In this paper I want to focus on the third.
In the literature, there is a lot of debate not just about the strength 
of the Normativity Argument, but also about its content – different 
commentators have given very different readings of Kripke’s remarks 
concerning the normativity of meaning and intention. Here I will set 
aside the exegetical issue, embracing without argument what may 
be called ‘the epistemological reading’ of Kripke’s remarks,1 and fo-
cus on the task of assessing its strength. In this connection, I will 
argue for two theses. The first one is that in his book Kripke dis-
cusses, even though he is not very explicit about it, two different, al-
beit related, problems – one in the philosophy of mind and the other 
in the metaphysics of language (or, more precisely, in metaseman-
tics) – and so his whole discussion of semantic dispositionalism, Nor-
mativity Argument included, should be seen as twofold in the very 
same way: there is a normativity argument against semantic dispo-
1 The epistemological reading is defended in Guardo 2014 and Zalabardo 1997. For 
a different reading see, e.g., Boghossian 2003, 2005; Gibbard 2012; Glüer, Wikforss 
2009; Hattiangadi 2006, 2007; Miller 2010; Whiting 2007, 2009; Wikforss 2001. Note 
that – as I explain in Guardo 2014, 755 fn. 7 – the epistemological reading is perfect-
ly consistent with the fact that the problem Kripke discusses in his book is metaphys-
ical, not epistemological, in nature. Note also that the epistemological argument I as-
cribe to Kripke has been independently put forward by Wright ([1989] 2001) and that, 
in any case, it is interesting in its own right and deserves, I think, to be discussed in-
dependently of who its proponents are.
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sitionalism in the philosophy of mind and there is another normativ-
ity argument against semantic dispositionalism in the metaphysics 
of language. My second, and most important, claim will then be that 
the Normativity Argument is much stronger when viewed as an ar-
gument in the philosophy of mind.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I sketch the first of 
the two problems Kripke discusses, the one in the philosophy of mind, 
and I describe the corresponding form of semantic dispositionalism. 
In section 3, I discuss the normativity argument against this seman-
tic dispositionalism and argue that it is quite a strong argument. In 
section 4, I turn to the problem in the metaphysics of language. Fi-
nally, in section 5, I discuss the normativity argument against se-
mantic dispositionalism in the metaphysics of language and show 
that it is much weaker than its companion in the philosophy of mind.
2 Semantic Dispositionalism in the Philosophy of Mind
When, talking about game theory, I utter the name ‘Schelling’, I refer 
to Thomas Crombie Schelling, the American economist – not to Frie-
drich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, the German idealist. When I use 
the word ‘red’, I refer to a certain class of shades. And when I say that 
68 + 57 = 125, by ‘+’ I mean the addition function. But what does this 
referring, this meaning amount to? The nature of this prima facie un-
problematic mental state is actually quite elusive and much of Witt-
genstein on Rules and Private Language is devoted to a discussion of 
the, no doubt somewhat incredible, idea that there is no such thing.
Take the case of ‘+’. We all think that by this symbol we mean the 
addition function; but what does this meaning addition – rather than 
some quaddition function which diverges from addition only when at 
least one of its arguments is authentically huge – consist in? The dif-
ference cannot be a matter of the way I answer particular ‘+’ prob-
lems, for the ‘+’ problems I am presented with never involve really 
huge numbers, and addition and quaddition diverge only when we get 
to such numbers. Nor can we answer the challenge by trying to ar-
gue that at some point I must have entertained thoughts that fit ad-
dition but not quaddition, for such thoughts would no doubt involve 
language, and so the challenge would have just been moved from the 
case of ‘+’ to that of the other words occurring in the thought in ques-
tion – the recursive definition of addition fits addition but not quaddi-
tion, but only if by ‘S’ I mean the successor function, and what does 
this meaning the successor function (rather than some other function 
which diverges from it only for huge arguments) consist in?
Such questions need to be answered. Saying that there is no dif-
ference between meaning addition and meaning quaddition is tanta-
mount to admitting that there is no such thing as meaning addition. 
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And if there is no difference between meaning addition and meaning 
quaddition, then there is no difference between meaning green and 
meaning grue (where past objects were grue if and only if they were 
green while present objects are grue if and only if they are blue), and 
so on. Therefore, saying that there is no difference between mean-
ing addition and meaning quaddition is saying that there is no such 
thing as meaning, period.
Dispositions seem to many to provide the most natural answer to 
this kind of question. The reason why I mean addition and not quad-
dition is that my dispositions track the former, not the latter.
Let us say, for concreteness’ sake, that quaddition starts to diverge 
from addition when at least one of its arguments is greater than or 
equal to 1,000,000; when that is the case, the result of a quaddition 
is always 5. And let us also assume that I have never been presented 
with ‘+’ problems involving arguments greater than 999,999. That 
does not mean that I do not have the disposition to answer ‘1,000,002’ 
if asked about ‘1,000,001 + 1’.2
Here is how Kripke ([1981] 1982, 22-3) introduces semantic dis-
positionalism:
To mean addition by “+” is to be disposed, when asked for any sum 
“x + y”, to give the sum of x and y as the answer […]; to mean quus 
is to be disposed, when queried about any arguments, to respond 
with their quum […]. True, my actual thoughts and responses in the 
past do not differentiate between the plus and the quus hypothe-
ses; but, even in the past, there were dispositional facts about me 
that did make such a differentiation.
And here is a more careful characterization of the view:
[…] the simple dispositional analysis […] gives a criterion that will 
tell me what number theoretic function φ I mean by a binary function 
symbol “f”, namely: the referent φ of “f” is that unique binary func-
tion φ such that I am disposed, if queried about “f(m, n)”, where “m” 
and “n” are numerals denoting particular numbers m and n, to reply 
“p”, where “p” is a numeral denoting φ(m, n). (Kripke [1981] 1982, 26)
So much for the introductory remarks. Let us now turn to the nor-
mativity argument that Kripke puts forward against this first form 
of semantic dispositionalism.
2 One could, of course, question the notion that, in the case of ‘+’ problems with re-
ally huge arguments, I have the disposition to answer with their sum. This is the point 
of the second of Kripke’s three arguments. For a promising attempt to deal with it see 
Warren 2020.
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3 The Normativity Argument in the Philosophy of Mind
Kripke’s normativity argument against the semantic dispositionalism 
of the previous section is concisely stated in the following passage:
“‘125’ is the response you are disposed to give, and […] it would 
also have been your response in the past”. Well and good, I know 
that “125” is the response I am disposed to give […], and maybe it 
is helpful to be told […] that I would have given the same response 
in the past. How does any of this indicate that […] “125” was an 
answer justified […], rather than a mere jack-in-the-box unjustified 
and arbitrary response? Am I supposed to justify my present belief 
that I meant addition […], and hence should answer “125”, in terms 
of a hypothesis about my past dispositions? (Do I record and inves-
tigate the past physiology of my brain?) (Kripke [1981] 1982, 23)
Let me unpack the passage a little bit.
From a logical point of view, the argument starts with the assump-
tion that it is a conceptual truth about meaning that one’s meaning 
a certain thing by a certain word can be used to justify their use of 
that word – and that when one justifies their use of a given word in 
terms of what they meant, the process takes a certain characteris-
tic form; for lack of a better term, I will say that the justifications in 
question are ‘non-hypothetical’.3
Here is an example of what Kripke has in mind. Let us suppose 
that, during a conversation, I say that analytic philosophers have a 
great deal of respect for Schelling’s work and that, taking me to be 
speaking of the German idealist, you comment that you have never 
had that impression. I realize that there has been a misunderstand-
ing, and I clarify that I was not referring to the German idealist, but 
to the American economist. My meaning the American economist can 
be used to justify my claim that analytic philosophers have a great 
deal of respect for Schelling’s work. And the justification process is 
especially straightforward; it does not rely on hypotheses but, rather, 
on what seems to be a form of non-inferential knowledge of my mental 
states: when I say something, I non-inferentially know what I mean, 
and I can use this non-inferential knowledge to justify my utterances.
3 In Guardo 2014 I construed this first part of Kripke’s argument in a slightly different 
way. According to the reading defended in that article, that when one justifies their use of 
a given word in terms of what they meant, the justifications in question are non-hypotheti-
cal is deduced from the ‘unhesitating’ character of our linguistic behavior, while here that 
is just assumed, without argument. I take the reconstruction I focus on in this paper to 
be preferable both from an exegetical and a philosophical point of view. That being said, 
none of this matters that much, since (as I note below and explain a bit more in detail in 
Guardo 2014) Kripke’s emphasis on the notion of justification is somewhat of a red herring.
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But if it is a conceptual truth about meaning that one can justify 
their use of a certain word by means of their non-inferential knowl-
edge of what they meant, then it is clear that a dispositional analysis of 
meaning can work only if it can account for such non-inferential knowl-
edge, i.e. only if speakers have non-inferential knowledge of their lin-
guistic dispositions. But, as a matter of fact, speakers do not have 
such knowledge. And so semantic dispositionalism is bound to fail.
I take this to be an extremely strong argument against the very no-
tion that the mental state of meaning can be made sense of in terms 
of dispositions. The first, conceptual, step of the argument is virtu-
ally impossible to deny, especially when one realizes that it is even 
more straightforward than Kripke makes it out to be. After all, here 
the point is that semantic dispositionalists must make sense of the 
fact that we all have non-inferential access to what we mean; Kripke 
introduces this idea by focusing on the role that this access plays in 
our justificatory practices, but one does not have to go about it that 
way: that we non-inferentially know what we mean is quite clear in 
itself, even independently of this knowledge’s role in our justificato-
ry practices.
The argument’s second step is quite solid, too. If dispositionalism 
were true, my non-inferentially knowing that I mean addition would 
require me to non-inferentially know, for any pair of huge numbers ‘M 
and ‘N’, that I am disposed to answer with their sum if asked about 
‘M + N’. And that is a knowledge which I most definitely do not have.
Note that what I am taking to be clear is not that it is not the case 
that I know, for any pair of huge numbers ‘M’ and ‘N’, that I am dis-
posed to answer with their sum if asked about ‘M + N’. This I may 
well know – let us say I can deduce it, with reasonable confidence, 
from the answers I do give to more manageable ‘+’ problems. What 
I believe is clear is only that, if I do have such knowledge, it is infer-
ential in nature.
Nor am I assuming that it is impossible for me to have the non-in-
ferential knowledge in question. No doubt there are possible worlds 
in which I do have non-inferential access, down to the tiniest detail, 
to my current brain states, and hence to my linguistic dispositions. 
What I am assuming is just that, as a matter of fact, I do not have such 
knowledge. This is all that needs to be assumed in order for the ar-
gument to go through, since its point is that semantic dispositional-
ism cannot make sense of the fact that I have non-inferential access 
to what I mean, in this world.4
The Normativity Argument, viewed as an argument in the philos-
ophy of mind, is, indeed, quite straightforward. In a certain sense, it 
4 For a more in-depth discussion of this second part of Kripke’s argument see Guar-
do 2014.
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comes down to the claim that semantic dispositionalism “[…] threat-
ens […] to make a total mystery of the phenomenon of non-inferential, 
first-personal knowledge of past and present meanings […]” (Wright 
[1989] 2001, 175). In order to resist it, one should show either that 
this is not a real phenomenon or that, contrary appearances notwith-
standing, a dispositional analysis can account for it. The first strat-
egy looks utterly desperate,5 while the second is inconsistent with 
what seem to be rather uncontroversial facts about our knowledge 
of our dispositions.
4 Semantic Dispositionalism in the Metaphysics  
of Language
In this section I turn to the first of the two theses I want to argue for, 
namely that in his book Kripke discusses two different problems, one 
in the philosophy of mind and the other in the metaphysics of language, 
and so all he says about semantic dispositionalism, Normativity Argu-
ment included, should be seen as twofold in the very same way.6
Let us start by coming back to the way I introduced the problem 
of meaning in the philosophy of mind. Following Kripke, I tried to 
show that the notion of meaning something by a sign is problematic 
by calling attention to the fact that it is not clear how to make sense 
of the difference between meaning addition and meaning quaddi-
tion, where quaddition was assumed to be a function which diverg-
es from addition only when at least one of its arguments is authenti-
cally huge. Kripke defines quaddition in a slightly different way: he 
stipulates quaddition to diverge from addition as soon as at least one 
of its arguments is greater than or equal to 57. However, Kripke al-
so assumes that we have never been presented with ‘+’ problems in-
volving arguments greater than 56, so the difference between his def-
inition and mine is superficial; in both cases, quaddition is defined 
in such a way that the answers we gave to the ‘+’ problems we have 
been presented with were consistent with both addition and quaddi-
tion. Now let me ask a question: why is this important? Why does it 
matter that our answers to the ‘+’ problems we have been presented 
with are compatible with both functions?
5 Of course, a meaning skeptic can deny the reality of “the phenomenon of non-infer-
ential, first-personal knowledge of past and present meanings” (Wright [1989] 2001, 
175) on the basis of the fact that, in their view, there is no such thing as meaning. How-
ever, such a move is clearly unavailable to the dispositionalist, whose goal is to vindi-
cate our intuitions concerning this mental state.
6 Of course, the problem in the metaphysics of language I am about to sketch is inter-
esting and deserving of discussion in its own right, independently of whether Kripke 
really had it in mind or not.
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The answer to this question is rather obvious: Kripke wants to 
build a case in which it is clear that the difference between meaning 
addition and meaning quaddition cannot be made sense of in terms 
of overt behavior, i.e. in terms of the answers we give to the ‘+’ prob-
lems we are actually presented with. But, as clear as it is that this 
is what he has in mind, a little reflection is more than enough to see 
that Kripke’s worry here does not make much sense. Overt behav-
ior is just not the kind of thing a mental state can be identified with. 
Saying that my meaning addition by ‘+’ consists in my giving (as op-
posed to my being disposed to give) certain answers to certain prob-
lems is not explaining what that mental state amounts to; it is saying 
that there is no such thing as meaning something by a sign, and then 
trying to substitute that concept with something else.
So now the question is: how is it that Kripke did not realize that? 
The answer is, I think, that while Kripke was working on Wittgen-
stein on Rules and Private Language he had in mind, besides the prob-
lem I described earlier, another one, too. The two problems are relat-
ed, and most of the time what holds with regard to the first problem 
holds in the case of the second one, too (and vice versa). Therefore, 
Kripke does not take the trouble to explicitly distinguish between 
them. But the two problems are distinct nonetheless, and sometimes 
what makes sense with regard to one does not make sense with re-
gard to the other. And so not distinguishing between them may lead 
one to worry about things that need not be worried about. What I de-
scribed in the previous two paragraphs is just one such case.
But what is this other problem that Kripke had in mind? As I have 
already hinted, it is a problem in the metaphysics of language. More 
precisely, it is the problem of explaining what determines the ref-
erence of a word.7 What makes it the case that the name ‘Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’ denotes a certain Austrian philosopher? What makes 
it the case that the predicate ‘being a philosopher’ refers to the class 
of individuals which, as a matter of fact, it does refer to? And what 
makes it the case that ‘+’ refers to the addition function, and not to 
quaddition?8
7 In Guardo 2018 I described this second problem in a slightly different way. I now 
think that that formulation is less than optimal and, therefore, in this paper I decided 
to drop it and substitute it with the one just given.
8 One may wonder how Kripke could fail to clearly distinguish this problem from the 
one described in section 2. The answer is, I think, that both problems can be rephrased 
in terms of correctness, and when phrased that way it is indeed quite easy to mistake 
one for the other. That the concept of reference has a normative dimension (and so the 
problem of explaining what determines the reference of a word can be rephrased in terms 
of correctness) is rather obvious: saying that ‘being a philosopher’ refers to a certain 
class of individuals is saying that that predicate is applied correctly if and only if it is 
applied to a member of that class. The availability of a formulation in terms of correct-
ness is somewhat less apparent in the case of the problem of the nature of the mental 
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Kripke’s two problems are, of course, related (their relationship 
will look especially close if one believes that the reference of a word 
depends on what people usually mean by it). But they are two dis-
tinct problems nonetheless. One has to do with the nature of a cer-
tain mental state, the other has to do with the relationship between 
linguistic expressions and entities in the world.
It is because they are distinct problems that, sometimes, what does 
not make sense in the case of one does make at least some sense in 
that of the other. In the case of the problem of explaining the nature 
of the mental state of meaning something by a sign, any reference 
to overt behavior can be discarded out of hand as clearly irrelevant. 
But in the case of the problem of explaining what makes it the case 
that a word refers to what it refers to, overt behavior seems to be at 
least part of the solution: granted, taken by itself, past usage does 
not show that ‘+’ does not refer to quaddition; but at least it rules 
out other functions, which diverge from addition also with regard to 
pairs of smaller arguments, or at least so it seems.9
Just as the problem Kripke is interested in is actually two problems, 
it is important to recognize that there are two semantic dispositional-
isms, one in the philosophy of mind and one in the metaphysics of lan-
guage. In the philosophy of mind, semantic dispositionalism is the the-
sis that what makes it the case that I mean, say, addition by ‘+’ is that 
I have certain dispositions, and not others: I have addition-tracking, 
not quaddition-tracking, dispositions. In the metaphysics of language, 
on the other hand, to be a semantic dispositionalist is to have a certain 
view of what makes it the case that a word refers to what it refers to: 
‘+’ denotes the addition function because it is that function which is 
tracked by the speakers’ dispositions concerning the use of that symbol.
state of meaning something by a sign, for such a formulation involves the semi-techni-
cal notion of metalinguistic correctness. That being said, the idea is rather easy to get. 
If by ‘+’ I have always meant quaddition, there is a sense – what Kripke calls the “meta-
linguistic” sense – in which for me it is correct to answer ‘5’ if asked about ‘1,000,001 + 
1’: ‘5’ is the correct answer in the sense that ‘+’, as I intended to use that symbol in the 
past, denoted a function which, when applied to the numbers I called ‘1,000,001’ and 
‘1’, yields the value 5. And so the problem of explaining what makes it the case that by 
‘+’ I mean addition (and not quaddition) can be seen as the problem of explaining what 
makes it the case that I should answer ‘1,000,002’ (and not ‘5’) if asked for ‘1,000,001 + 1’.
9 As a matter of fact, in this case appearances are misleading, for reasons I explain 
in Guardo 2012b and elsewhere. That being said, nothing of importance hinges on this 
point here.
Some may take the upshot of the foregoing to be not that Kripke was interested in two 
distinct (and yet related) problems, but that the problem Kripke was really interested 
in is not the one he seems to be interested in but, rather, the one in the metaphysics 
of language I have just sketched. I believe that such a conclusion would be too strong. 
Kripke is quite clearly interested in the nature of the mental state of meaning, too. In 
fact, one of the things that makes it clear is his use of the Normativity Argument, which 
is very strong when viewed as an argument in the philosophy of mind but, as I am about 
to argue, rather weak as an argument in the metaphysics of language.
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And just as there are two semantic dispositionalisms, one can try 
to put forward a normativity argument both in the philosophy of mind 
and in the metaphysics of language. In section 3, I argued that, in the 
philosophy of mind, normativity considerations are extremely effec-
tive. In the next section, I will try to show that in the metaphysics of 
language the situation is completely different.
5 The Normativity Argument in the Metaphysics  
of Language
According to the epistemological reading I am assuming here, the 
Normativity Argument is epistemological in nature. The argument 
gets called ‘Normativity Argument’ because it makes use of the no-
tion of justification, which is normative, but its focus on our justifi-
catory practices is just a means to call attention to an epistemologi-
cal point, and in fact the argument can be rephrased without making 
any mention of justifications, so that ‘Normativity Argument’ is real-
ly something of a misnomer.
In the philosophy of mind, focusing on the epistemological core of 
the argument – setting aside all talk of justifications – gets us some-
thing like this: it is a fact that we have direct access to (non-infer-
ential knowledge of) what we mean by our words; we do not have, 
however, any such access to our linguistic dispositions; therefore, 
dispositional analyses of meaning cannot account for the epistemol-
ogy of this mental state, and so they can be discarded out of hand.
To me, this looks like a very strong argument. But can such con-
siderations be generalized to the case of semantic dispositionalism in 
the metaphysics of language? Well, in the metaphysics of language, 
semantic dispositionalism is the view that what makes it the case 
that a word refers to what it refers to are the speakers’ dispositions. 
Therefore, here, in order to get off the ground, the Normativity Ar-
gument would need to call attention to some feature of our epistemic 
relationship with facts about reference – and, relatedly, of our knowl-
edge of a word’s reference – that semantic dispositionalism cannot 
make sense of. What we need is an asymmetry between our knowl-
edge of a word’s reference, our semantic competence, and our knowl-
edge of the speakers’ dispositions. Hence, the issue of the effective-
ness of ‘normative’ considerations against semantic dispositionalism 
in the metaphysics of language comes down to a very simple ques-
tion: is such an asymmetry anywhere to be found?
To the extent that I can make sense of the notion of reference, it 
seems to me that the character of our epistemic relationship to the 
relevant facts is perfectly consistent with the idea that those facts 
are facts about the speakers’ dispositions. The mental state of mean-
ing a certain thing by a certain word is clearly a conscious state (a 
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state with a phenomenal component), to which we have direct, non-
inferential access. Facts about the reference of linguistic expres-
sions, though, are not like that. Granted, that ‘+’ refers to addition is 
something I am extremely confident about. It may even be said that 
that is something I am certain of. But the very same degree of confi-
dence I have in the fact that my own and my fellow speakers’ dispo-
sitions concerning ‘+’ track addition, and not some other quaddition-
like function. Therefore, it seems that nothing about the nature of 
our epistemic access to facts about reference tells against the idea 
that these facts are really facts concerning how we are disposed to 
use the words of our language.
One might try to salvage the argument by building on the fact that, 
in its original version, the Normativity Argument made use of the con-
cept of justification. Of course, we have seen that, in the case of the 
version of the argument Kripke runs in the philosophy of mind, any 
mention of justifications can be removed without in any way weak-
ening the argument. But maybe things are different when we turn to 
the metaphysics of language; maybe here the reference to our justif-
icatory practices is essential.
Prima facie, this is an interesting suggestion. When one realiz-
es that the point of the Normativity Argument is epistemological, 
Kripke’s emphasis on the notion of justification starts to look rather 
strange. But if it were to turn out that in the case of the metaphysics 
of language the argument requires that concept, then the way Kripke 
builds it would make much more sense. That being said, I do not see 
how a focus on our justificatory practices could provide the kind of 
asymmetry we are after. And so my conclusion is that the Normativ-
ity Argument is not a serious threat to semantic dispositionalism in 
the metaphysics of language.
6 Conclusion
Kripke took the Normativity Argument to show not just that seman-
tic dispositionalism is false, but that it is clearly false, that nobody 
in their right mind could take seriously such a blatantly inadequate 
account of meaning. The standard interpretation of the Normativi-
ty Argument – according to which the point of the argument is that 
while meaning a certain thing by a certain word entails categorical 
oughts, having certain dispositions does not – makes Kripke’s as-
sessment of the strength of his argument look overly optimistic.10 Af-
ter all, that meaning a certain thing by a certain word entails cate-
10 For this reading see the works cited in note 1.
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gorical oughts is far from uncontroversial.11 On the other hand, the 
epistemological reading I sketched in section 3 makes, I think, per-
fect sense of Kripke’s view of the dialectic, since the argument de-
scribed in that section is indeed a very strong one. But by vindicat-
ing Kripke’s assessment of the merits of the Normativity Argument 
the epistemological reading raises a worry: if it is true that nobody in 
their right mind could take seriously such a blatantly inadequate ac-
count of meaning as semantic dispositionalism, how is it that among 
the ranks of semantic dispositionalists we find philosophers such as 
(to name just a few) Simon Blackburn (1984), Charlie Martin and John 
Heil (1998), Fred Dretske (1981) and Jerry Fodor (1990)?
The two theses I have argued for in the previous two sections can, 
I think, help answer such worries. As shown in section 4, the label ‘se-
mantic dispositionalism’ is ambiguous. It may refer to the view in the 
philosophy of mind which is the primary target of Kripke’s normativ-
ity considerations, but it may also refer to a thesis in the metaphysics 
of language. And, as I have argued in section 5, when viewed as an 
argument against the latter thesis the Normativity Argument is quite 
weak. Hence, it may be that the reason why Blackburn, Dretske, Fo-
dor, etc. found semantic dispositionalism attractive is that what they 
had in mind was, at least to some extent, not the view in the philos-
ophy of mind, which is indeed blatantly inadequate, but that in the 
metaphysics of language.12
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